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Abstract 
Conspiracy theories cover topics from politicians to world 
events. Frequently, proponents of conspiracies hold these 
beliefs strongly despite available evidence that may challenge 
or disprove them. Therefore, conspiratorial reasoning has 
often been described as illegitimate or flawed. In the paper, 
we explore the possibility of growing a rational (Bayesian) 
conspiracy theorist through an Agent-Based Model. The agent 
has reasonable constraints on access to the total information 
as well its access to the global population.  
The model shows that network structures are central to 
maintain objectively mistaken beliefs. Increasing the size of 
the available network yielded increased confidence in 
mistaken beliefs and subsequent network pruning, allowing 
for belief purism. Rather than ameliorating and correcting 
mistaken beliefs (where agents move toward the correct 
mean), large networks appear to maintain and strengthen 
them. As such, large networks may increase the potential for 
belief polarization, extreme beliefs, and conspiratorial 
thinking – even amongst Bayesian agents.   
Keywords: Conspiratorial thinking; Extreme beliefs; Agent-
Based Models; Bayesian updating 
Introduction 
Truth is the shattered mirror strewn in myriad bits; while each 
believe his little bit the whole to own 
Richard Burton (The Kasîdah of Hâjî Abdû El-Yezdî) 
 
In recent years, scientists, scholars, and commentators have 
remarked upon the apparent rise of epistemic echo chambers 
(see e.g., Bakshy et al., 2016) and increasing political 
polarization. Echo chambers refer to communities, online or 
otherwise, that interact predominantly with themselves and 
who rarely, if ever, seek information aside from the 
information available within the chamber. Whether 
endogenously created (such as cults) or exogenously created 
(such as living on an island with no contact to the outside 
world), the emergence and maintenance of epistemically 
enclosed systems and their consequences is interesting and 
worth studying. The current paper explores the possibility of 
generating, maintaining and strengthening encapsulated 
belief communities through an Agent-Based Model (Gilbert, 
2008) where every agent is rational (here, Bayesian) and 
where information is potentially available to challenge the 
viewpoint of the agent.  
 Specifically, we are interested in exploring the possibility 
of generating conspiratorial beliefs. That is, beliefs that are 
maintained despite being objectively false and there being 
available evidence to challenge or disprove the theory in 
question. Proponents of such beliefs frequently hold these 
positions strongly. We explore whether it is possible to 
strengthen confidence in objectively mistaken beliefs 
through a rational process given imperfect knowledge about 
the world. Rather than assuming illegitimate updating 
processes or special cognitive functionality, the model tests 
if, in principle, a Bayesian conspiracy theorist can emerge 
and be maintained. That is, the model explores whether or 
not individual differences are a necessary requirement for 
the emergence and maintenance of extreme beliefs.  
The Burton quote at the top of the introduction can be 
seen as foundational for the paper. It suggests that beliefs 
can be generated and maintained as a fragment of a larger, 
and often very different, picture. Further, it intimates that 
humans generate inferences about the world on the back of 
the evidence available to us at any given time in our lives. 
This information may come through first-hand experience or 
through other sources such as parents, peers, media outlets, 
and experts.  
In order to set the scene for the Agent-Based Model, we 
briefly consider how conspiratorial thinking has previously 
been approached in the literature.  
Conspiratorial thinking 
Conspiracy theories can be loosely defined as beliefs that 
are held strongly when evidence is broadly available to 
challenge or entirely refute the theory. Yet, proponents 
maintain (and might even strengthen) their belief in the 
theory despite the availability of this evidence. However, in 
order to adequately simulate emerging conspiracy theories, 
we need to employ a more stringent definition of 
conspiratorial thinking.  
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According to Barkun (2003), conspiracy theories are 
characterized by three traits. First, conspiracy theories 
operate under the assumption that nothing happens by 
accident. From a cognitive perspective, this may be 
described as causal oversensitivity where the reasoner 
generates causal links between disparate and supposedly 
separate pieces of information, leading to over-connection. 
Second, Barkun argues that for conspiracy theorists, nothing 
is really what it appears to be on the surface (i.e. the ‘real’ 
causal mechanisms between pieces of information is 
covered up(?) by any official story). This element, too, 
suggests a cognitive agent who over-weights and over-
generates causal links between independent pieces of 
information. For example, some proponents of the moon 
landing conspiracy theory believes the director of A Space 
Oddysey: 2001, Stanley Kubrick, to be involved in 
producing faked photography because Kubrick hired crew 
for 2001 who used to work for NASA (Frederick Orway and 
harry Lange). Finally, Barkun argues that conspiracy 
theorists tend to believe things to be highly connected. To 
this end, Barkun argues that conspiracy theories eventually 
become enclosed systems that are falsifiable if confronted 
with additional evidence and therefore “a matter of faith 
rather than proof”. Presumably, this entails that conspiracy 
theorists might stop seeking new information and instead 
assume their beliefs to be a priori true. As evident from 
these definitions, the operationalizing of conspiracy theories 
usually involves special cognitive make-up and a heuristic 
process that treat information related to the conspiracy 
theory as qualitatively different from ‘normal’ belief 
updating. The current model explores whether these are 
valid assumptions. 
Indeed, Birchall (2006) describes conspiratorial thinking 
as illegitimate updating and belief maintenance (as opposed 
to normative, legitimate reasoning). In general, 
conspiratorial thinking is typically conceived as an 
abnormal and potentially fallacious (or illegitimate) 
reasoning process, which relies heavily on cognitively 
biased heuristics such as over-generation of causal links, 
erroneous attribution of motives, and mistaken perception of 
interconnectivity. Commonly, these conspiratorial thinking 
accounts assume conspiracies are a product of mistaken or 
misguided reasoning.  
In this paper, we provide a proof of concept that 
conspiratorial thinking can emerge from Bayesian rational 
paradigms given access to a subset of evidence and the 
possibility of interacting with other like-minded agents. As 
will be argued later, we believe both of these assumptions to 
be realistic and grounded in psychological findings. As will 
be explained further in the paper, we show that 
conspiratorial agents do not require special cognitive 
abilities or predispositions in order to be supremely 
confident in their (objectively mistaken) belief. This 
approach is reminiscent of work conceptualizing supposed 
reasoning flaws through cognitively reasonable processes. 
This work includes, but is not limited to, Bayesian accounts 
of argument fallacies (e.g., Corner et al., 2011; Harris et al., 
2012), a Bayesian model of appeals to authority (e.g. Hahn 
et al., 209; Harris et al., 2015), and skepticism in climate 
change (Cook & Lewandoswky, 2016). Further, Bayesian 
agents represent a rational process of integrating new 
information with prior beliefs pertaining to that hypthesis. 
For this reason, Bayesian agents have been used previously 
to explore belief diffusion in networks (see e.g. Jern et al., 
2009; Olsson, 2013; Denrell & Le Mens, 2017).  
While the current work builds on similar Bayesian 
accounts of belief updating, we provide a novel contribution 
to the field by implementing a computational, Agent-Based 
Model that allows for interaction between agents across 
time.  
 For the purpose of this paper, we take conspiratorial 
thinking to be strongly held beliefs that depart from the 
objective mean where evidence is available to challenge or 
refute the theory. Barkun and Birchall argue that these 
beliefs arise from mistaken or flawed heuristics and/or 
illegitimate reasoning processes that bias proponents of 
conspiracy theories toward connectivity, attribution of 
hidden intentions and over-generation of causal structures. 
Further, Grimes (2016) argues that conspiratorial beliefs are 
untenable with larger network structures, as the available 
information to challenge erroneous views increases. As 
discussed below, there are some potential challenges for 
conspiracy accounts that assume special cognitive functions 
such as oversensitivity toward causal connections as the 
default cognitive foundation. 
Challenges for traditional accounts 
The traditional perspectives on conspiratorial thinking may 
be challenged on at least two grounds. First, it is potentially 
problematic to ascribe different cognitive functions to the 
emergence of conspiratorial thinking for two reasons. For 
one, it is unclear whether this type of reasoning would 
permeate all beliefs held by that individual (e.g. would a 
conspiracy theorist also be prone to over-generate causal 
structures in billiards or snooker). If it were not systemic, it 
would (insufficiently) appear to be a post hoc account of a 
particular belief that happens to exhibit such properties. For 
another, it would not represent a process account of 
conspiratorial thinking. Rather, it would assume differences 
and apply these to arrive at the conclusion. Instead, we 
explore whether it is possible to generate objectively 
mistaken beliefs from the same cognitive processes that 
generate objectively true beliefs. Both of these would 
remove the expectancy of abnormality on the part of the 
conspiracy theorist.  
Second, traditional accounts tend to focus on the cognitive 
function of the isolated individual, rather than on systemic 
belief diffusion as a result of interactions with other people. 
As discussed in the following, studies and simulations have 
shown that aggregate behavioral patterns might not be 
reducible to the components in isolation if the components 
can interact with each other in meaningful ways (see e.g. 
Johnson, 2001; Ball, 2005) given complex and dynamic 
environments (Johnson, 2009). Faced with the problem of 
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epistemic isolation, we apply Agent-Based Modeling to 
explore the potential of growing a Bayesian conspiracy 
theorist without adding special cognitive functions to the 
agent in question.  
Agent-Based Modeling 
In order to circumvent the problems caused by traditional 
individual-based accounts of cognition, we employ Agent-
Based Modeling, which allows for simulations of belief 
networks populated by Bayesian agents. This further allows 
for introduction of heterogeneity, as will be discussed later 
(here, initial sampling allows agents to gather and evaluate 
data individually, which provides heterogeneous priors). 
Agent-Based Models (ABMs) are computer simulated 
multi-agent systems that describe the behavior of and 
interactions between individual agents, who operate in 
synthetic environments (Gilbert, 2008; Bandini et al., 2009). 
Agents are encoded on a computational basis, and may 
implement and explore models of cognitive function. They 
allow for complex, dynamic and adaptive systems to emerge 
through interactions between agents and with the 
environment as well as across time (Miller & Page, 2007). 
ABMs may be described in terms of their three fundamental 
components: Agents, Links, and Patches.  
Agents are the nodes representing the active cognitive 
entities of the system. They can make decisions and make 
use of information in any way that is formally expressible. 
These functions include, but are in no way limited to, utility 
valuations, Bayesian belief inferences, stock market 
engagement, and so forth. The agents may reproduce (e.g. 
give birth to a new agent), move around the simulated 
space, and make new (and potentially more relevant) 
decisions as they learn more about the environment. In order 
to engage with the environment, agents will have specified 
rules for agent-environment interactions such as fishing, 
purchasing a house, moving around the simulated space and 
so forth. These behaviors and inferences may yield dynamic 
and adaptive aggregate behavioral patterns. For example, if 
all agents harvest simultaneously, Tragedy of the Commons 
type problems (Ostrom, 2012) can emerge. In the present 
model, we allow for Bayesian belief updating as the agents 
encounter new information or talk with other agents via 
links.  
Links represent rules for possible interactions between 
agents. Links can be any interactivity that can be expressed 
formally. The interaction may be direct (e.g. communication 
between two agents or sales structure between agents, see 
Epstein & Axtell, 1996) or indirect (e.g. social attraction or 
repulsion or emotional feedback, see Schelling, 2006; 
Epstein, 2013). Interactions allow for feedback loops to 
emerge, which in turn may generate aggregate behavioral 
patterns that are irreducible to the components in isolation.  
Patches represent the simulated environment in which 
agents exist. They can have any and all properties that are 
formally describable. If consumable (such as grass for 
sheep, fish for fishers), they may give the agent energy, 
money, or other affordances. Patches may be dynamic such 
that they might regrow or migrate. Further, patches may 
facilitate or restrict movement of agents in the simulated 
space. The patches provide the foundational and potentially 
dynamic environment in which the agents live and act. In 
the model we present, the environment restricts interaction 
between agents if the search potential is low. 
Compared with traditional methods, ABMs are capable of 
simulating dynamic and adaptive decision-making in 
changeable environments (Miller & Page, 2007). This 
allows for agents to self-organize without hard-wiring 
expected aggregate behavioral patterns such as emergent 
echo chambers. Rather, ABMs allow for these properties to 
emerge, or, in the terminology of Epstein and Axtell (1996), 
to grow. ABMs further allow for agent and environmental 
heterogeneity (i.e. agents with different cognitive 
capabilities).  
Growing a Bayesian conspiracy theorist 
The aim of the current model is to test a proof of principle 
that conspiracy theorists can emerge through entirely 
rational processes without providing any special cognitive 
functions, heuristic strategies, or access to unique 
information. In order to do so, we generate an Agent-Based 
Model where agents can sample information, communicate 
with one another, and update their beliefs about the world.  
Given this initial proof of concept, we simplify the 
epistemic challenge and consider only one abstract belief. 
The true probability of the Gaussian distribution from which 
the agents sample is 0.5. The standard deviation can be 
manipulated to represent greater or lesser noise in the 
information environment. In the present paper, the standard 
deviation is set to 0.2. For the sake of understanding, the 
probability may represent the belief in the fairness of a coin. 
If the coin is fair, the distribution of tosses is trivially 50-50 
between heads and tails. However, if the coin is not fair, the 
distribution can be skewed in the direction of either heads or 
tails. Understood in this way, the agents try to understand if 
they are in a world in which the coin is fair (uncovering, as 
it were, the true, underlying probabilities) or if they are in a 
world where the coin is rigged to either side (arriving at an 
objectively mistaken belief).  
If agents are able to generate, maintain and possibly 
strengthen a mistaken belief in the epistemic state of the 
belief, the agent will have exhibited conspiratorial traits, as 
this fulfills the criterion for the definition in the above: a 
potentially strongly held, yet objectively mistaken belief, 
availability of information to challenge or refute the theory, 
and access to that information. The literature review 
uncovered two central positions that we explore here. One, 
we explore Grimes’ (2016) argument that conspiratorial 
thinking is untenable in a large network structure. If this is 
true, we should see a global regression towards the 
objectively true mean given larger networks (that is, fewer 
agents who believe they are in a rigged coin world). Two, 
we explore Barkun and Birchall’s arguments that 
conspiratorial thinking relies on illegitimate reasoning and 
biased heuristics. As will be described below, the agents in 
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the model are perfect Bayesian reasoners. If conspiratorial 
thinking requires special cognitive properties, we should not 
expect the Bayesian agents to generate strong and mistaken 
beliefs about the world. The model implements six key 
elements: generation of prior beliefs, constrained search, 
network generation, communication between agents, belief 
updating, and network pruning.  
 In order to generate a subjective prior belief, agents are 
born onto the world and sample randomly generated data 
from a Gaussian distribution (µ = 0.5, σ = 0.2). In a 
frequentist manner, these are used to calculate a perceived 
mean and probability density. The sampling represents the 
worldview of each particular agent before they are able to 
communicate with other agents.  
Having generated a prior belief for each agent (and thus 
introduced sampling heterogeneity), the model relies on four 
additional assumptions and mechanisms. First, agents 
cannot sample all available data in the simulated world. This 
means that they do not have access to all data sampling that 
other agents have encountered unless they communicate 
with the other agent in order to learn the beliefs of that 
agent. As such, agents do not have perfect and complete 
knowledge about the world in which they live. We believe 
this is a reasonable assumption, as humans do not have 
perfect knowledge in real life. Second, although all other 
agents are hypothetically available, agents cannot 
communicate to every other agent in the simulated world. 
Rather, each agent randomly generates the amount of 
possible communication links. Like the first assumption, we 
believe this is a reasonable assumption, as humans in the 
real world cannot communicate with every other person on 
the planet, but has to settle for a subset of all living persons.  
Third, in order to make the agents rational, they update 
their beliefs about the world in a Bayesian manner. 
Bayesian updating represents the rational integration of 
prior beliefs with new evidence to generate posterior belief 
in the hypothesis. This approach has been applied to a host 
of related phenomena such as argumentation (Hahn & 
Oaksford, 2006; 2007), source credibility (Bovens and 
Hartmann, 2003; Harris et al., 2015), and reasoning and 
decision-making (Oaksford & Chater, 2007). The 
integration is formally expressed through Bayes’ theorem 
 
where p(h|e) denotes the posterior belief in the hypothesis 
(h) given the evidence (e). As such, agents treat each new 
encounter as a data point to be integrated within their 
subjective probability density function. Bayesian updating 
ensures that the agents are fully rational in their belief 
revision when encountering new evidence.  
Finally, several studies on confirmation bias, selectivity 
bias, and in-group behavior strongly suggest that agents are 
not entirely stochastic and non-directed in their information 
search. Taking inspiration from segregation studies (e.g., 
Schelling, 2006), we introduce a mild preference for people 
who remotely share their beliefs about the world. The agents 
are relatively tolerant and will engage in conversation with 
any other agent who is within ± 1.5 standard deviations of 
its own perception of the world. Given Gaussian 
distributions, this means that the agent will speak to 86.6% 
of people within its belief distribution.  Thus, they are 
willing to talk to and integrate information from agents who 
have different viewpoints than their own. However, if they 
are confident in their belief, they will engage with less 
diverging viewpoints, as their probability density narrows. 
As an analogy, this means that an agent might be willing to 
discuss political questions with people with different points 
of view, but would refuse to engage in discussion with 
people who believe that fair coin-flips are 60-40 rather than 
50-50 in cases where they are absolutely certain about the 
latter and less certain about the former.  
In sum, the agent is born into the world by sampling 
randomly generated pieces of information related to the 
hypothesis in question. This informs the mean and standard 
deviation of their prior. Second, the agents generate 
networks with other agents within their network radius 
(which may be limited or encompass the full system). 
Having set up the model, the agents will communicate 
freely and honestly (i.e. representing their belief in the 
hypothesis to the best of their ability), which enables 
Bayesian belief updating. Agents will maintain 
communication networks with other agents who are within 
1.5 standard deviation of their subjective understanding of 
the world (i.e. their belief in the hypothesis). If agents 
within the network fall outside of those boundaries, the 
agent deactivates the network contact with that particular 
agent. If agents cannot find any suitable agents within their 
range, they decrease confidence (simulating negative 
feedback) and thus expand acceptable search parameters for 
the following tick. This allows for dynamic network pruning 
(Ngampruetikorn & Stephens, 2015). 
Main findings: Limited and extended networks 
We implemented the above model in NetLogo (5.2.1) and 
manipulated the model in terms of the size of the network. 
For limited networks, agents had a search range of 10 of 100 
(as a product of their geographical location). Extended 
networks, on the other hand, had a search range of 80 of 
100. Agents could connect to and sample randomly from 
other agents within agent search range who fall within their 
network criteria. Figs 1a and 1b show the extent to which 
search capability influences network generation.  
a   b 
Figures 1a and 1b: Limited and extensive networks 
 
The overall belief structure did not differ significantly 
between limited and extended networks. Some, but not all 
agents regressed towards toward the mean while some 
agents retained their objectively mistaken belief (see Fig. 2a 
and 2b, which are histograms where number of believers are 
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on the y axis and agent belief is on the x axis), we observe 
differences in belief confidence. As seen in Figs. 3a and 3b, 
extended networks allowed for interactions with 
increasingly like-minded agents, which in turn increased 
belief confidence. This is true both for agents who obtain 
objectively true and false beliefs. As agents become 
increasingly confident, their probability density narrows, 
meaning that they are less willing to engage with agents 
with differing beliefs. Extended networks allow them to 
form and maintain contact with agents who share their 
specific beliefs such that they increase their confidence in 
that particular view of the world. This means purification of 
beliefs and purification of networks, i.e. the emergence of 
epistemic echo chambers.  
 a      b 
Figures 2a and 2b: Limited and extended belief structures 
a    b 
Figures 3a and 3b: Limited and extended confidence (0-1) 
 
Overall, the model shows that fully rational agents can 
maintain and potentially strengthen objectively mistaken 
beliefs. Further, given a mild preference for interaction with 
like-minded agents, we observe the rise echo chambers. 
This effect is strengthened with the size of the network. 
Rather than making extreme beliefs untenable as predicted 
by Grimes, we show that large networks, here quantified in 
terms of the number of reachable agents for any given agent, 
can engender extreme belief maintenance and belief purism.   
Discussion and concluding remarks 
The Agent-Based Model in the paper provides a theoretical 
proof of concept that a Bayesian agent can become an 
ardent conspiracy theorist under three main assumptions. 
One, the agent does not have perfect and full access to all 
available information that exists in the world, but can only 
sample a sub-set of that information. This means that the 
agent does not rely on perfect knowledge of the system. 
Depending on the practical conceptualization of information 
accessibility, the agent may have access to very limited or 
more extended amounts of information. Two, the agent 
cannot talk to every other person in the world, but can only 
talk to a sub-set of all existing agents. Similar to assumption 
one, this means the agent cannot converse with all other 
agents and learn their subjective access to information. In 
the current model, information after prior sampling is 
gleaned through interactions with other agents. 
Consequently, by limiting the amount of other agents with 
whom an agent can engage, the model naturally also limits 
the access to available information. Principles one and two 
are concerned with the degree to which the agent can 
sample information and learn about the world. Three, agents 
search for and interact with other agents on the basis of their 
current worldview. They are willing to communicate with 
most other agents, but avoid other agents with whom they 
radically disagree about the nature of the world.  
 
The Rise of Echo Chambers  
Together, these three (we believe reasonable) assumptions 
show that larger networks do not yield belief amelioration 
(as was postulated by some theoreticians who believed the 
Internet to facilitate greater communication between people 
and thereby allow a global regression towards the mean). 
Rather, the model shows that extended networks, given 
plausible constraints to exposure, lead to the growth of echo 
chambers and eventual belief purism, whereby agents 
increasingly discard those who do not share their specific 
beliefs about the world.  
One might compare this increasing belief purism to 
development of political ideologies. In a limited network 
structure (e.g., a small village), the model suggests that left-
leaning voters are willing to communicate with other left-
leaning voters (and some right-winged voters depending on 
the mean and probability density function of the specific 
voter, mutatis mutandis for right-winged voters). However, 
in an extended network structure (such as a metropolis or 
Facebook), the model suggests that voters will have access 
to other voters who have more similar worldviews. This 
allows for emergence of political echo chambers where 
extreme voters have access to other extreme voters. From 
this, greater belief confidence grows and network pruning 
increases, as belief purism emerges. We therefore expect 
increases in network structures will facilitate rather than 
hinder belief extremism and confidence in worldviews.  
The model presented in the current paper allows for this 
dynamic adaption. In the beginning, agents cluster around 
people with whom they share general beliefs about the 
world. However, as they increase in confidence, their 
probability densities narrow, meaning that fewer agents will 
fit within the ± 1.5 standard deviations of the perceived 
mean. As the agent becomes increasingly confident in its 
own reading of the world, it will be decreasingly inclined to 
engage with agents who entertain different viewpoints. This 
allows for belief communities to fracture and radical and 
supremely confident cells to emerge. The emergent echo 
chambers function as cyclical maintenance of a peculiar 
belief.  
This finding is interesting because larger networks did not 
yield belief amelioration, but rather belief solidification. It 
opens up for a novel way to approach and model epistemic 
communities that maintain strong beliefs despite available 
data challenging their beliefs (e.g., creationists, climate 
skeptics, and radicalized or discriminatory beliefs).  
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Emergence of reasonably mistaken views  
Central to the model, the agents do not have full and perfect 
knowledge of the world and can only talk to a sub-set of 
other existing humans. Given the fact that agents update 
their beliefs in a Bayesian manner, their cognitive system 
can be described as rational and entirely reasonable. Yet, 
given incomplete access to data and given the network 
properties, the model shows that the agents can become 
entirely confident in objectively mistaken views. As such, 
we show that extreme beliefs such as conspiracies could 
emerge through entirely rational processes. While this does 
not preclude heuristic strategies or special cognitive 
functions, the model shows that these are not necessary for 
strongly held mistaken beliefs to emerge. Aside from 
emerging, mistaken beliefs are also able to survive (and 
even strengthen) in such an environment rather than being 
swallowed by mainstream beliefs.  
Further, agents had a mild preference for communicating 
with like-minded agents. Rather than making extreme 
beliefs untenable, the model suggests that increasing the size 
of the network intensifies the process of radicalization and 
augments the confidence even in an objectively mistaken 
belief. In the age of the Internet, this finding is worth 
considering seriously and exploring further  
In conclusion, we have provided a proof of concept that 
shows the impact of network structures in generating and 
maintaining extreme beliefs such as conspiratorial thinking. 
A Bayesian agent can generate and even increase its 
confidence in objectively mistaken beliefs.  
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